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ESSAY
BACK TO BASICS: A COMMENT ON THE
"REVIVED CASE" FOR ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Virginia E. Nolan*
Edmund Ursin"

I.

INTRODUCTION

In an ambitious series of articles, most recently in the Michigan and
Harvard Law Reviews, Professors Steven Croley and Jon Hanson
undertake the task of rescuing the strict products (enterprise) liability
revolution. ! These articles, which have already attracted academic

attention, and even a following, are a provocative addition to the literature.2 In this Essay, however, we demonstrate that Croley and Hanson
share with "enterprise liability" critics a fundamental misunderstanding
of the enterprise liability theory-a misunderstanding that has important
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. B.S. 1969, Russell Sage
College; J.D. 1972, Albany Law School; LL.M. 1975, George Washington University.
** Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. AB. 1964, J.D. 1967, Stanford
University.
°
1. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Casefor
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993) [hereinafter Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the
Revolution]; Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-andSuffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995) [hereinafter Croley & Hanson,
Pain-and-Suffering Damages]; Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An
Alternative Explanationfor Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 8 (1991).
2. See Note, Absolute Liabilityfor Ammunition Manufacturers, 108 HARv. L. Rv. 1679
(1995) (adopting the methodology of Croley and Hanson). Joseph Page has written that Croley and
Hanson have provided an "elegant exposition of the case for enterprise liability in the products
context." Joseph K. Page, Liability for Unreasonably and Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Does
Negligence Doctrine Have a Role to Play?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 87, 105 n.86 (1996). Page
concludes, however, that their proposal for absolute manufacturer liability is both "[u]nworkable and
[r]adical." Id. at 118; see also Alexandra Lahav, Book Note, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 565, 570
n.30 (1997) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALiSM (1996))
(characterizing Croley and Hanson's approach as "left-leaning" law and economics).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:161

consequences for the ongoing debate over practical issues of tort reform.
The enterprise liability revolution was led by "first generation 3
scholars and judges, such as Professor Fleming James, Jr. and Justice
Roger Traynor, who emphasized the goals of victim compensation and
loss spreading,4 or risk distribution, as Croley and Hanson prefer.' In
recent years, however, "second generation" scholars have assailed judicial
attempts to apply strict liability in cases of design and warning (as
opposed to manufacturing) defect cases and have urged a return to a
negligence-like standard of liability.' These scholars also assert that
manufacturer-provided insurance through tort liability is unnecessary and
inefficient.7 Some, including Professor George Priest, believe that
compensation through the tort system is unnecessary because existing
first-party insurance provides adequate compensation.' More moderate
tort critics believe that, even if compensation is needed, tort law is an
inefficient, and thus improper, means to provide that compensation. 9
These critics argue that compensation through the tort system is overgenerous and regressive because it includes large awards for pain and
suffering, and because the collateral source rule permits recovery of
amounts covered by first-party insurance." Moreover,the defect requirement of strict products liability robs the tort system of the assurance of

3. See Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra note 1, at 691 n.29.
4. See VIRGIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY:
RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3-12 (1995); George L. Priest, The
Invention of EnterpriseLiability: A CriticalHistoryof the IntellectualFoundationsof Modern Tort

Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461,470,498-99 (1985). For a compilation of decisions utilizing the loss
spreading rationale, see Edmund Ursin, JudicialCreativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
229, 302 n.470 (1981).

5. See Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra note 1, at 711.
6. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future ofAmerican
ProductsLiability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1332, 1334 (1991); David G. Owen, The Fault Pit,26
GA. L. REv. 703,709-10 (1992); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginningand the PossibleEnd ofthe Rise
ofModern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 653-54 (1992); see also James A. Henderson,
Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The QuietRevolution in ProductsLiability: An EmpiricalStudy ofLegal
Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990) (discussing the change in direction ofjudicial decisionmaking

in products liability cases).
7. See George L. Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE LJ.
1521, 1586-87 (1987).
8. See id.
9. See 1 AMERICAN LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY 29-30 (1991) [hereinafter 1 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY].
10. See I id.at 29; George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REv.
1, 15-18 (1987); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 313, 361 (1990).
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prompt compensation that is implicit in the loss spreading goal."
Second generation critics thus conclude that "the use of tort law as a
device for expanding insurance protection against disabling injuries
is . . . a questionable enterprise."' 2
Croley and Hanson bring "the tools of law and economics to the
defense of the premises of the first generation of products scholars and
judges."'3 They identify market failures that justify the expansion of
manufacturer liability and argue that expansion has not gone far
enough-that the "vice of the first generation was not overambition but
underambition."' 4 Thus, Croley and Hanson urge the adoption of
absolute manufacturer liability-liability without a defect requirement. 5
Their "enterprise liability... would place on manufacturers the full costs
of product-caused accidents."' 6
In contrast to second generation critics who use the existence of
widespread first-party insurance as an argument against expanded

11. See I ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supranote 9, at 35-37; Schwartz, supra note 10, at 360-61.
In addition, comparative fault defenses further complicate tort litigation. See 1 ALI REPORTERS'
STUDY, supranote 9, at 29-30; Priest, supra note 10, at 11. Croley and Hanson point out that some
critics also object to the loss spreading goal because its resultant liability rules are seen to remove
consumer incentives to prevent accidents. See Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra note
1, at 720-21. The first generation, in its emphasis on victim compensation, had downplayed "the
theoretical possibility that ...consumers [would] have less incentive to prevent accidents under
strict liability than they did under the previous negligence regime." Id at 710-11 n.105. We believe
that this theoretical possibility is just that--theoretical. Little incentive to take care is lost since fear
of physical injury or death provides ample safety incentives. See infra note 69 and accompanying
text.
12. 1 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 9, at 30.
13. Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra note 1, at 769; see also Virginia E.
Nolan & Edmund Ursin, EnterpriseLiability and the Economic Analysis of Tort Law, 57 OHO ST.
L.J. 835 (1996) (analyzing the economics analysis of Guido Calabresi).
14. Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra note 1, at 797. We focus on Croley and
Hanson's attempt to resurrect the first generation's primary justification for enterprise liability---the
risk distribution goal. Croley and Hanson also identify market failures that they believe revive other
facets of the enterprise liability theory. First, they argue that consumers lack the full information
necessary for them to make consumption and warranty decisions that reflect their true preferences.
See id. at 770. Their imperfect information exists because information is costly, and "any means of
obtaining... information requires investment." Id. Croley and Hanson argue that the costs of
information undermine "the efficiency of consumer product markets." 1d. They further argue that a
market failure arises because "manufacturers are not well informed of consumers' warranty
preferences." 1d. at 779. Because of this, "products and warranties may not efficiently conform to
those preferences." Id. Croley and Hanson argue that in some circumstances "the average
consumer... experiences 'exploitation' at the hands of manufacturers as a result of their efforts to
maximize profits by providing both products that are less than optimally safe and warranties that are
less than optimally generous." Id. at 781. They call this the "new exploitation theory." Id.
15. See id. at 789.
16. Id. at 787.
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manufacturer liability, Croley and Hanson argue that widespread firstparty insurance provides a justification for absolute manufacturer
liability. 7 They note that first-party insurers "rarely and imperfectly
adjust premiums to reflect each consumer's decisions concerning which
products are purchased, how many of each product are purchased, or how
carefully those products are consumed."'" They argue that consumers
who are compensated for pecuniary losses through such first-party
insurance will ignore those costs, thereby creating what they call the
"first-party insurance externality,"' 9 a phrase first coined in an article by
Jon Hanson and co-author Kyle Logue." This "first-party insurance
externality poses a potentially substantial obstacle to ...deterrence
objectives,"' and Croley and Hanson argue that absolute manufacturer
liability "which would place on manufacturers the full costs of productcaused accidentse ''r is "the only rule that will accomplish those
goals." Thus, Croley and Hanson transform the first generation's goal
of risk distribution into thefact of risk distribution, which creates a need
for absolute liability on accident prevention grounds.
Croley and Hanson note that there is no first-party externality with
respect to nonpecuniary risks because these risks are rarely covered by
first-party insurance.2' They also state that insofar as enterprise liability
compensates for "risks that are not or cannot be deterred, it serves only
an insurance function." Second generation scholars assert that "consumers do not demand insurance for nonpecuniary losses, as evidenced
by the absence of a significant market for such insurance."26 Croley and
Hanson, in contrast, argue that consumers may demand nonpecuniary loss
insurance.27 If so, they write, the first generation's risk distribution

17. See id. at 785. It is unclear whether Croley and Hanson fully accept the view that
widespread first-party insurance obviates the need for victim compensation. Their argument is often
carefully stated in a contingent form. Thus, for example, they write that their analysis and proposals

apply "[t]o the extent that consumers are compensated for their pecuniary losses through first-party
insurance." Id. at 785-86.
18. Id. at 785.
19. Id.
20. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-PartyInsuranceExternality:An Economic

JustificationforEnterpriseLiability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 131 (1990).
21. Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra note 1, at 786.
22. Id. at 787.
23. Id. at 793.

24. See id. at 795.
25. Id.

26. Id.; see also Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private
InsuranceMarkets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 524 (1984); Priest, supra note 7, at 1553.
27. See Croley & Hanson, Pain-and-SufferingDamages, supra note 1, at 1812-13.
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justification for the shift toward enterprise liability would be "revive[d]
in original form"---the lack of first party insurance could justify liability
rules that spread nonpecuniary losses.2 8 Thus, in Croley and Hanson's
"revived" case for enterprise liability, the first generation's loss spreading
goal survives only to justify absolute liability for nonpecuniary losses
arising out of unpreventable accidents-and then only if Croley and
Hanson can establish, against the overwhelming weight of scholarly
thought, that fully informed consumers would demand nonpecuniary loss
insurance.
In this Essay we argue that the debate over enterprise liability needs
to go back to basics-that the first generation's theory of enterprise
liability needs to be understood, not "revived." We demonstrate, for
example, that first generation scholars questioned the desirability of
compensation for nonpecuniary losses, thereby undermining second
generation criticisms and placing the first generation at odds with Croley
and Hanson. We also argue that the "unrevived" enterprise liability
theory provides a blueprint for the development of a personal injury law
suitable for the twenty-first century. We demonstrate that contrary to the
assertion of some critics, the first generation goal of compensation for
pecuniary loss has not been satisfied by first-party insurance. To achieve
that goal, we argue that courts should adopt a strict enterprise liability
that dispenses with the defect requirement of products liability. Unlike
Croley and Hanson, however, our "first generation" doctrine draws upon
the strict products liability precedent but incorporates the insights of nofault compensation plans, which we demonstrate are a product of the
enterprise liability theory.
Il.

THE NEED FOR VICTIM COMPENSATION

George Priest notwithstanding, there is every reason to believe that
a need for victim compensation for pecuniary loss persists.29 The 1991
American Law Institute's Reporters'Study: EnterpriseResponsibilityfor
28. Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra note 1,at 795. Croley and Hanson note
that if their intuition is wrong and consumers do not demand insurance for nonpecuniary losses, at
most this would imply that "damages under (enterprise liability] should be reduced to cover only the
pecuniary component of unpreventable accidents." Id. Croley and Hanson also argue that the case
for absolute manufacturer liability for nonpecuniary losses can be made on deterrence, as opposed
to insurance, grounds. See id. at 795 n.448. Thus, "the beneficial deterrence effects of awarding
nonpecuniary-loss damages for unpreventable accidents may outweigh [any possible] deleterious
insurance effects." Id. at 795 nA51.
29. See Priest,supranote 7, at 1587. It is unclear whether Croley and Hanson fully accept the
view expressed by Priest. See supra note 17.
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PersonalInjury ("ALT Reporters' Study"), for example, found that "[a]t
least 30 million individuals in this country are without insurance for
health care."' By 1994 it was widely reported that the figure was closer
to thirty-seven million,3 and that figure exceeded forty million by
1996.32 Moreover, the ALI Reporters' Study found that "another 10 to
20 million are significantly underinsured. '33 This figure increased to
twenty-nine million by 1996. 3' The ALI Reporters' Study concluded that
"[ilt would be rash.., to dismiss out of hand the role that tort damage
awards play in providing a form of health care insurance for the victims
' Moreover, "an even starker gap [in
of enterprise injuries."35
the social
safety net] confronts people who lose earnings due to injury."36 With
respect to disability and life insurance, the AL! Reporters' Study found
that "[d]isability insurance---particularly long-term disability insurance-is not widespread." '7 Furthermore, "life insurance.., probably
does not provide a substantial economic cushion to the families of most
breadwinners upon their death." ' 8 Thus, the ALl Reporters' Study
concluded that "compensation paid to the victims of injury... from all
sources is far from adequate." ' 9
III.

UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY

Even if a need for victim compensation exists, second generation
critics argue that tort law is an inappropriate vehicle to provide that
compensation.' These critics, however, misunderstand the enterprise
liability theory. They correctly link strict products liability and other
expansive tort developments of recent years to that theory, but they fail
to recognize that these developments are merely one facet of a broader
tort theory. In fact, compensation plans formed the centerpiece of early
enterprise liability scholarship. Inspired by the enactment of workers'
compensation plans, scholars such as Leon Green and Fleming James

30. 1 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supranote 9,at 156.
31. See Gregg Easterbrook, Back to Basics on Health Care,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, at MI.
32. See Edwin Chen, Number Without Health InsuranceRises, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, at
AS.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

1 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 9, at 156.
See Chen, supra note 32, at A5.
1 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 9, at 156.
IId. at 44.
1 Id. at 163.

38.

lId

39. lId
40. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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sought for decades to supplant tort law and its requirement that victims
prove negligence with legislatively enacted compensation plans tailored
to discrete categories of accidents, including, most notably, automobile
accidents.4
Only after it became clear in the 1940s that automobile compensation plan proposals had foundered on the legislative seas of special interest politics did enterprise liability advocates look seriously to courts and

the common law to achieve their goal of victim compensation. It was not
until the mid-1950s, for example, that Fleming James recognized the
potential of strict products liability to achieve that goal, literally on the
eve of the strict products liability revolution of the 1960s. 4 The 1960s
also saw a major advance on the automobile compensation plan front

with the 1965 publication of Basic Protectionfor the Traffic Victim by

Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell.43 That work built on previous
enterprise liability scholarship and found success with the flurry of
legislative enactments of no-fault plans in the early 1970s."

Strict products liability and no-fault compensation plans, therefore,
are aspects of a broader enterprise liability theory, and they were
recognized as such by their proponents. For example, Fleming James, the

leading academic advocate of the application of "strict enterprise
liability" in products cases, 5 hailed the automobile no-fault compensation plan proposed by Keeton and O'Connell as a promising new

41. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: 11, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255,27779 (1929); Leon Green, The Individual'sProtection Under NegligenceLaw: Risk Sharing,47 Nw.
U. L. REV. 751,756 (1953); Fleming James, Jr., ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors:A Pragmatic
Criticism, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1156, 1157-58 (1941); Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear Chance: A
TransitionalDoctrine,47 YALE L.J. 704, 716 (1938); Fleming James, Jr., Book Review, 4 U. Cmu.
L. REV. 158, 159-60 (1936-1937) (reviewing CHARLES 0. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss
DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS (1936)). A landmark contribution was a 1932 Columbia
study which proposed a compensation plan for automobile accidents. See Fleming James, Jr., The
Columbia Study ofCompensationforAutomobile Accidents: An UnansweredChallenge, 59 COLUM.
L. REV. 408, 408-11 (1959).
42. See Fleming James, Jr., ProductsLiability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 192 (1955) (published in
two parts and discussing duties to all suppliers and manufacturers).
43. ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM:
A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). Other important works focusing
on the problem of automobile accidents include ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964); and Clarence
Morris & James C.N. Paul, The FinancialImpact ofAutomobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 913
(1962).
44. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of the Surveys, 56
NEB. L. REV. 23,26 (1977).
45. See Priest,supra note 4, at 470, 478.
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O'Connell similarly recognized

automobile no-fault and his own proposed extensions of no-fault
insurance beyond automobile accidents as a "form of tort liability called
'enterprise liability."' 47
Given the compensation plan origins of the enterprise liability
theory, it should come as no surprise that damages reform was also an
important, although today overlooked, aspect of that theory. Indeed, by
the early 1960s, the leading academic advocate (Fleming James), the
judicial architect (Roger Traynor), and scholar (Albert Ehrenzweig) who
gave the enterprise liability theory its name unambiguously endorsed the
need for damages reform and courts as the agent of that reform as tort
law embraced the loss spreading premise.48 And Leon Green, the
seminal figure in the early development of enterprise liability thinking,
had lent his support to this view.49 The damages reform theme, which
called into question both the collateral source rule and the traditional
award of damages for pain and suffering, is, of course, congruent with
the approach of no-fault compensation plans, which provide for assured,
but limited, compensation.
IV. THE ENTERPRISE LiABILIrY RESPONSE TO
SECOND GENERATION CRITICS

The enterprise liability response to second generation critics who
decry the fact that compensation through the tort system is overgenerous
(and funded regressively) because of awards for pain and suffering and
because of the collateral source rule is simple. Unlike these critics who
assume that "[n]o matter how passionately they wish to compensate
victims, judges are stuck with the administrative apparatus of tort law,
[including] the rules of damages,"5 enterprise liability scholars endorsed

46. Fleming James, Jr., The Future of Negligence in Accident Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 911, 91617 (1967) (referring to KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 43).
47. Jeffrey O'Connell, ExpandingNo-FaultBeyond Auto Insurance:Some Proposals,59 VA.
L. REv. 749, 773 (1973); see also JEFFREY O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT
INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975).
48. See Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 344 (Cal. 1961) (in bank)
(Traynor, J., dissenting); ALBERT A. EHRENZwVEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 47-55 (1951); 2
FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25 (1956); Fleming James, Jr.,

Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582, 583-84 (1956).
49. See LEON GREEN, TRAFFiC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE 92-96 (1958) (proposing
an automobile compensation plan which would not compensate victims for pain and suffering).
50. STEPHEN D. SuGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 36 (1989); see 1 ALI REPORTERS'
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the idea that courts should play a role in damages reform. The answer to
critics of the compensation and loss spreading goals is that these goals
point to the need for damages reform linked to the expansion of liability.
Similarly, once one recognizes the compensation plan origins of the
enterprise liability theory, it becomes apparent that the defect requirement
is not integral to the enterprise liability theory and, indeed, is an
impediment to the achievement of the goals of that theory. In fact, early
in the history of strict products liability, Justice Traynor advised that the
"complications surrounding the definition of a defect suggest inquiry as
to whether defectiveness is the appropriate touchstone of liability."'"
The enterprise liability response to critics of strict products liability,
therefore, is that courts should explore the possibility of a strict liability
regime that does not require defectiveness as a prerequisite to victim
compensation.
Second generation critics have asserted that the "abandonment of the
traditional defect requirement... is one significant step in the evolution
of American products liability that our courts never will take."52 These
critics point to the fact that in many accidents more than one product is
causally involved, and they ask how, absent a defect criterion, one is to
allocate liability---for example, among automobile, truck, bicycle, and
telephone pole manufacturers in an accident involving all of these (and
more, such as tires and asphalt) products.53 The enterprise liability
answer is that these critics focus too narrowly on the existing doctrine of
strict products liability. A broader focus would reveal that courts can
craft a common law enterprise liability that eliminates the defect requirement while also avoiding the multiple product problem.
V.

ILLUSTRATIVE ENTERPRISE LIABILITY PROPOSALS

We believe that courts can craft a common law enterprise liability
that eliminates the defect requirement while limiting damages awards.
Moreover, we believe this can be done as a "natural and easy extension"
of existing doctrine-by courts operating "well within the framework of

STUDY, supra note 9, at 29-30.

51. Roger J.Traynor, The Ways and Meanings ofDefective Productsand Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REV.363, 372 (1965).
52. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American ProductsLiability
Frontier:The Rejection ofLiability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1329-30 (1991).

53. See id. at 1280-81.
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our common law tradition."' 4 In fact, two distinct doctrinal sources are
available for use by courts, and we offer two proposals to illustrate how
courts might create a "first generation" enterprise liability.
First, it is hornbook law that the strict products liability doctrine
applies to business premises whose activities fall within the "license to
use" and "hybrid sales-service" categories of strict products liability."
Thus, strict liability applies to a laundromat whose washing machine
malfunctions 6 or to a beauty parlor that applies a defective permanent
wave solution to a patron.57 It would seem a small step to apply a
broader business premises strict liability to cases that fail to fit precisely
into the "license to use" and "hybrid sales-service" categories. Thus,
courts could easily recognize a doctrine of business premises enterprise
liability applicable to persons injured on the premises of supermarkets,
department stores, restaurants, and similar establishments. In contrast to
strict products liability and previous proposals to extend "strict" liability,
victim compensation under our proposal would not turn on whether an
enterprise's premises could be characterized as "dangerously defective."
Instead, the proposed doctrine would impose a strict enterprise liability
for personal injuries arising out of the use of business premises by
entrants on those premises.
A second doctrinal source for a new enterprise liability, the
hazardous activity strict liability doctrine, already dispenses with the
defect requirement. The growth of this doctrine has been inhibited by the
Restatements of Torts, which preclude the application of strict liability
to hazardous activities that are "a matter of common usage."58 Nevertheless, courts have increasingly ignored this criterion while imposing
strict liability on such diverse and common activities as oil drilling,59
fumigation, 6 crop dusting,6 hauling of fuel by tanker trucks,62 and

54. Fleming James, Jr., General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 924 (1957).
55. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 719-21 (5th
ed. 1984).
56. See Garcia v. Halsett, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423 (Ct. App. 1970).
57. See Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697, 701 (NJ. 1969).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(d) (1977); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520(b)

(1938). The operation of automobiles, for example, although recognizably dangerous, is "a matter
of common usage." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i.
59. See Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952, 955 (Cal. 1928) (holding that even the
lawful maintenance of an oil well can result in liability when oil harms neighboring lands).
60. See Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1948) (in bank) (stating that the common use
of certain gases among fumigators does not qualify such activity as a matter of common usage).
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the storage of gasoline by service stations in underground tanks.63
This case law could easily provide the precedent for a broader
enterprise liability. Courts, for example, might impose strict liability on
railroads for injuries occurring when trains collide with persons or
vehicles at crossings or elsewhere and when train derailments cause
injury to passengers or bystanders. In Siegler v. Kuhlman, the Washington Supreme Court applied strict liability to a trucker whose gasoline
trailer overturned and exploded.' It would be no stretch to move from
Siegler to railroad strict liability. Indeed, railroading clearly meets the
criterion for liability that is emerging in the case law. Like the commercial hauling of fuel, railroading creates hazards unlike those routinely
created by individual citizens pursuing their everyday activities.65
Although these enterprise liability proposals eliminate the defect
requirement, they do not run afoul of the multiple product problem
associated with absolute manufacturerliability.6 Like workers' compensation plans and auto no-fault, these proposals look to the specified
activity or locus of the accident to allocate no-fault enterprise liability.
The owners of a railroad or supermarket (or their insurers), for example,
would compensate the person injured-even if several products are
causally related to the injury.
These proposed doctrines would also eliminate defenses based on
victim fault. The early enterprise liability precedent is, of course,
workers' compensation, and the inappropriateness of these defenses was
recognized by James in the 1940s 7 and O'Connell in the 1970s.6" As

61. See Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 318 (Or. 1961) (noting that cropdusting can damage
neighboring crops even when care is used); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 223 (Wash.

1977) (en bane) (noting that although common in some areas, cropdusting is not a matter of common
usage).
62. See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Wash. 1972) (en bane).
63. See City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515, 516 (D. Colo. 1981)

("The widespread use of gasoline in no way diminishes its inherently dangerous character.").
64. See Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1187.
65. See Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization ofHazardous Activity Strict
Liability, 65 N.C. L. REv. 257, 297 (1987).
66. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE LAW OF
PREnsEs LIABILITY § 6.9, at 142 (2d ed. 1988) (pointing to the "nettlesome" defect problem).
67. See Fleming James, Jr. & John J. Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63

HARv. L. REV. 769, 780 (1950) ("IT]he abolition of the defense of contributory negligence ...clearly adds a further incentive to safety on the part of perennial defendants .... ").
68. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposalto Abolish Contributoryand ComparativeFault with

Compensatory Savings by Also Abolishing the CollateralSource Rule, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 591, 592.
O'Connell suggests that states interested in alleviating inefficient administration and inadequate
compensation problems of traditional tort systems use a "rule making almost any faulty conduct on
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the ALl Reporters' Study has recently reiterated,
[L]ittle incentive to take care is lost when a patient (or worker or
consumer) [or person injured on a business premises or by a railroad]
is told that even though he might suffer a painful, perhaps even fatal
injury, he or his surviving dependents will be able to recover compensation for the losses.69
Because our proposed doctrine provides an assurance of compensa-

tion, it should, as suggested by Justice Traynor, be accompanied by
"curbs on... inflationary damages" so that "the cost of assured

compensation [does not] become prohibitive."7 The substantive
premises have long been in place for the judicial reform of damages law.
In 1977, for example, the California Supreme Court in Borerv. American

Airlines, Inc. described the "strong policy reasons" that argue against
compensation for "intangible, nonpecuniary loss."7I Such losses were
seen as "difficult to measure," and the court stated that they "can never
be compensated" by money damages.' Moreover, "the burden of pay-

ment... must be borne by the public generally in increased insurance
premiums or, otherwise, in the enhanced danger that accrues from the
greater number of people who may choose to go without any insurance."' rs These policy considerations, of course, support judicially
created limitations on recoverable damages.74 Similarly, Li v. Yellow
the part of an injured victim irrelevant for purposes of liability or damages." Id. (footnote omitted).
69. 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILrIY FOR PERSONAL
INJuRy 511 (1991) [hereinafter 2 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY].
70. Traynor, supra note 51, at 376.
71. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977) (in bank).
72. Id. at 862-63.
73. Id. at 862.
74. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 680-81 (Cal. 1985) (in bank)
(upholding legislative cap on pain and suffering damages); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 964 (Cal.
1982) (in bank) (denying pain and suffering damages in a wrongful life action). In their consideration of the proper measurement of damages in this new enterprise liability, courts could examine
the array of approaches suggested by the enterprise liability scholars in the 1950s and early 1960s,
as well as more recent proposals by O'Connell and others. See 2 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra
note 69, at 159-316; Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain
and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 937 (1989); Danzon, supra note 26, at 533; O'Connell,
supra note 68, at 592. O'Connell has proposed that courts simply abolish the award for pain and
suffering, as well as the collateral source rule, while making an explicit award of attorneys' fees. See
O'Connell, supra note 68, at 592. This proposal has the merit of a clean solution, clearly crafted
along no-fault lines. Courts might prefer, however, to formulate their new damages rules in Louis
Jaffe's terms, stating as a guideline that "the award for pain and suffering ... be measured and
justified in terms of a contribution to the real costs of the litigation." Louis L. Jaffe, Damagesfor
PersonalInjury: The ImpactofInsurance, 18 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 219, 235 (1953). Or courts
might prefer, at least initially, to adopt Justice Traynor's rule of thumb that "ordinarily the part of
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Cab Co.75 and other decisions abolishing the contributory fault defense
can be seen as the first step in the judicial alteration of damages law
since their comparative fault rule commands a reduction in damages
based on comparative fault. These decisions also pave the way for a
more rational enterprise liability doctrine that eliminates any consideration of victim fault.
VI.

CROLEY AND HANSON'S "REvIVED" CASE COMPARED

Our "first generation" proposals differ fundamentally from Croley
and Hanson's revived case for enterprise liability. First, by shifting the
focus from manufacturers to specified activities or the locus of an
accident (business premises, railroads), our proposals avoid the problem
of allocating liability in multiple product cases. More fundamentally, the
policy premise of our proposals is the assurance of adequate compensation for accident victims; consistent with that premise, our absolute
liability is linked to damages reforms such as limitations on damages for
pain and suffering and the abolition of the collateral source rule.
In contrast, Croley and Hanson argue that traditional damages rules
are necessary to prevent accidents efficiently. They would, therefore,
retain the traditional award for pain and suffering, and they would shift
losses already compensated by first-party insurance to manufacturers on
accident prevention grounds. While we clearly would not favor a tort
regime in which accident levels would rise significantly, we, like the first
generation, believe that the primary focus of enterprise liability should
be victim compensation. Moreover, we believe, along with the ALI
reporters and others, that doctrines, such as ours, designed on the thirdparty liability, no-fault model create "a considerable financial incentive
to take the measures necessary to reduce hazards... including the
human errors of... managers and employees."76 Our proposals offer
the "promising blend of efficient compensation, economical adminis-

the verdict attributable to pain and suffering [should] not exceed the part attributable to pecuniary
losses." Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 346 (Cal. 1961) (in bank) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting). This approach, in fact, would provide for attorneys' fees while decreasing the amount
of litigation sparked by uncertainty regarding the size of pain and suffering awards. Each of these
approaches would, as James urged, recognize "within the framework of common-law development.., the need for... progressively adopting a functional view ofthe amounts to be recovered."
James, supra note 48, at 585.
75. 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975) (in bank) (abolishing the rule of contributory negligence
in favor of "pure" comparative negligence).
76. 2 ALI REPORTERS' STuDy, supra note 69, at 507.
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tration, and efficient prevention!" that has recommended no-fault plans
from workers' compensation to recent medical nonfault proposals." If
our proposals (and further extensions) alleviate the need for victim
compensation, the question remains whether tort law should shift all
product-related accident costs to manufacturers through the sort of
absolute liability proposed by Croley and Hanson. Whether such a
venture would be worth its cost and whether such a system could be
fashioned by courts are the sorts of questions that the first generation
asked about proposed reforms.

77. 2 Id. at 534; see also Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law:
Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 430 (1994) (noting that third party liability
of workers' compensation "may achieve about as much by way of deterrence as any other liability
regime'). In addition, it "eliminates the need to expensively litigate issues such as negligence and
contributory negligence. Also, it satisfies injured workers' basic insurance needs." Id. at 430 n.261.
78. See 2 ALI REPORTES' STUDY, supra note 69, at 494; Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C.
Weiler, EnterpriseMedical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108
HARV. L. REV. 381,432-36 (1994).
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